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Abstract
We conduct an experiment to assess gender dierences across dierent
economic contexts. Specically, we test whether women are more sensitive to
the decision-making context in situations in which dierent fairness principles
can be used. We nd that women adopt more often than men conditional
fairness principles that require information about the context. Futhermore,
while most men adopt only one decision principle, most women switch between
multiple decision principles. These results complement and reinforce Croson
and Gneezy's organizing explanation of greater context sensitivity of women.
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A large number of experimental studies in Economics and Psychology have docu-
mented gender dierences in preferences (Croson and Gneezy 2009). For example,
women have been found to be less prone to competition (Gneezy et al. 2003; Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007) and more risk averse in most contexts (Eckel and Grossman
2008). These dierences are primarily based on comparisons between the aggregate
behavior of men and women in a wide variety of experimental contexts. In contrast,
there are few studies that look at gender dierences at the individual level, and
even fewer that explicitly address the important question of the interaction between
individual characteristics, e.g. gender, and the (experimental) context.1
Croson and Gneezy (2009: 455) hypothesize that changes in the experimental con-
text may indeed explain apparently contradictory results on gender dierences in
preferences. This hypothesis has received support from a few studies. Cox and Deck
(2006) compare the behavior of men and women in dictator and trust games and
nd a higher sensitivity of women to dierent experimental contexts. Moreover, the
results of Buchan et al. (2008) suggest that the nature of the experimental task
will in
uence the level of cooperation extended by either gender. Yet, none of these
papers provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between the gender of
the decision-maker and the the social context in which decisions are made.
This paper aims to test Croson and Gneezy's hypothesis by use of a within-subject
experimental design. In this study, the decisions of men and women are systemat-
ically compared in relation to changes in the experimental context. In order to do
so, we have participants confronting twenty distribution decisions, each preceded by
a real-eort task. The total amount of money to be distributed depends on par-
ticipants' eort in the task as well as sheer luck. This makes the twenty decision
1Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) is an important exception.
2contexts potentially dierent, in the sense that individual eort may vary between
participants and sheer luck plays a role.
To interpret participants' decisions in a changing context, we refer to the literature
on distributive justice in real-eort experiments (Konow 2003). This literature has
shown that dierent people adopt dierent fairness principles in distribution situa-
tions (Konow 2000; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2004; Cappelen et al. 2007; Becker
and Miller 2009). Such a multiplicity of fairness principles can also be expected in
this experiment. Before the distribution phase, participants learn their contribu-
tion to the production of the good that is to be distributed, and information on
contributions allows participants to use several principles of justice (Konow 2003).
For example, some participants may decide that all participants deserve to be re-
warded equally, and other participants that distributions are to be merit-related or
entitlement-based.
Interestingly, the experimental literature on fairness principles has also shown that
people switch between dierent principles when the context changes (Messik and
Sentis 1979; Babcock et al. 1995; Konow 2000; Ubeda 2010). This is important for
this paper, since this study aims ultimately to demonstrate that women are more
sensitive than men to relevant information provided in the experiment, and that
women change their behavior according to that information.
Two sets of ndings are reported here consistent with the idea that women are
more sensitive to the decision context. First, women adopt more often than men
conditional fairness principles that require information about the context. Second,
while most men adopt only one decision principle, most women switch between
multiple decision principles. These results complement and reinforce Croson and
Gneezy's organizing explanation of greater context sensitivity of women.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
3design as well as the fairness principles used in this work. In section 3, we use
Croson and Gneezy's hypothesis to derive some predictions for this experiment. In
section 4, the results of the experiment are presented. Finally, section 5 discusses
the results and concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
To study gender dierences in context sensitivity, we analyze, focusing on gender, the
experimental data reported in Ubeda (2010). Participants were 60 undergraduates
(30 men, 30 women), recruited via the on-line recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner
2004) from a wide range of disciplines at the University of Oxford. The experi-
ment was programmed and conducted using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants
received $6 for taking part in a `Decision Making Study' lasting approximately 90
minutes. They were also told that their total earnings would depend upon their deci-
sions and other participants' decisions during the experiment. The average earnings
per participant were $11.5 and ranged from a minimum of $6 to a maximum of
$26.
The experiment consists of 20 one-shot pure distribution games with production.
In each one-shot, participants play two phases. At the beginning of the rst phase
random pairs are formed, and the same two subjects take part in the rst and the
second phase. In the rst phase participants perform a real eort task; in the second
phase, they make a pure distribution decision.
The goal of the production phase is to induce a feeling of entitlement by using a
real-eort task. The real-eort task consists of a series of puzzles in which the letters
of a word have been scrambled. Subjects have to unscramble as many puzzles as
they can out of ten. Individuals are endowed with initial endowments corresponding
4to their eort in this phase. For each word they correctly unscramble they receive
four tokens. Individual and group endowments are common knowledge.
After the production phase, a random shock is introduced. Each individual outcome
has an independent 50% probability to be aected. The shock halves participants'
endowment, thus the group endowment is also reduced. In this experiment, both
discretionary and non-discretionary variables can potentially dier among subjects,
therefore changing the context in which decisions are made.
In the second phase, participants make a pure distribution decision. Both members
of the group have to decide anonymously how to distribute, between them, the
joint benets after the shock -if a shock has occurred at all. They do not receive any
feedback until the end of the experiment, preventing them from forming expectations
about others' behavior, so trying to rule out reciprocity.
In every one-shot, participants are randomly paired with another participant in the
room. A random stranger mechanism is used. At the end of the experiment, the
computer randomly chooses one period and one decision for each pair to be paid.
The exchange rate is 3 tokens=1 pound.
After the experiment, participants' decisions are classied according to several fair-
ness principles. In this paper, we use the denition of fairness ideals proposed by
















L(a;q) = a1q1 (3)
mkfmSE;mL;mLEg represents the dierent fairness ideals, and it corresponds to
the amount a particular subject keeps for herself.
X(a;q) represents the nal outcome to be distributed, and it comes from the amount
produced by both subjects i, where if1;2g. In this case the outcome could be
aected by two variables: discretional (q) and exogenous (a) variables.
X(a;q) = x1(a1;q1) + x2(a2;q2) (4)
xi = aiqi (5)
In this experiment, a is determined by an external shock, which subjects have no
control over. In contrast, q corresponds to subjects' eort in the production phase,
which of course can be discretionally aected by subjects. a and q take the following
values:
a 2 f0:5;1g (6)
q 2 [0;40] (7)
6Variables q and a potentially change across the 20 one-shot games producing het-
erogeneity in the nal outcomes. This heterogeneity allows us to study the dierent
decision principles that men and women use. In particular, participants' eort to
produce the money to be distributed as well as the external random component may
change in every game. Eort and luck are two key variables for the emergence of
fairness principles in distribution situations (Konow 2003).
3 Predictions
In this section, Croson and Gneezy's organizing explanation is used to make two
working hypothesis about the behavior of men and women in this experiment. These
authors argue: `We believe that the cause of these con
icting results is that women
are more sensitive to cues in the experimental context than are men. [...] Small
dierences in experimental design and implementation will thus have larger im-
pacts on female participants than on male participants' (p. 463). In our repeated
distribution-game experiment this would mean that:
Hypothesis 1. Women on average react more often to changes in the social con-
text of the experiment.
By changes in the social context of the experiment, we mean changes in the levels
of the endogenous (eort) and exogenous (shock) variables. To put it dierently, we
hypothesize that while men disregard information on performance and the occur-
rence of the random shock, women use both pieces of information and change their
behavior accordingly.
7Hypothesis 2. Individual women adopt on average a larger number of decision
principles.
Four decision principles are considered. On the one hand there is pure selshness,
on the other there are the three fairness principles described in section 2. We
hypothesize that while men stick to one of the principles, women switch between
dierent principles. Note that this hypothesis requires a within-subject analysis of
participants' decisions.
4 Results
The data comprise 5 experimental sessions involving a total of 30 women and 30
men. Each session lasted for 20 periods. Given that each subject makes a decision
in each of the 20 periods, we have a total of 20 x 30 = 600 distribution decisions
for each gender. Before testing our two hypotheses about distribution behavior, we
report and compare the performance of men and women in the twenty repetitions
of the real-eort task.
4.1 Relative performance in the real-eort task
Figure 1 shows the performance of men and women in the real-eort task across
periods. Dierences in performance across periods re
ect the dierent levels of
diculty in the set of puzzles participants are asked to solved. The performance of
men and women look remarkably similar; on average, women solved 6.01 puzzles per
period, and men 6.03. Using a random-eect linear regression and controlling for the
period, the performances of men and women are not signicantly dierent (see Table
1 in appendix A). This result is consistent with the ndings of previous papers that
8show that there are no gender dierences in performance in noncompetitive tasks
(Gneezy et al. 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). Additionally, no decay over
time is observed in the performance of men and women.
Figure 1: Average performance by period
The fact that there are no gender dierences in performance allows us to focus exclu-
sively on the distribution phase. On average men and women reach the distribution
phase with the same endowment, so no gender bias is transferred into the second
part of the experiment.
4.2 Overall dierences between genders
Figure 2 plots the average relative amount that participants keep in the distribution
phase. In sharp contrast to performance data, we nd clear gender dierences in
distribution behavior. In each and every period, men on average keep a larger
share of the total amount than women do. Across periods, women keep fourteen
9percentage points less than men (73% vs. 87%). Using a random-eect regression
model and controlling for the period, the result that women keep less than men
is signicant at any conventional statistical level (see Table 1 in the Appendix A).
This result is consistent with the ndings of some experimental papers on generosity
(Eckel and Grossman 1998). However, other studies do not nd gender dierences
in generosity (Bolton and Katok 1995).
Figure 2: Average relative amount participants keep
An average decision across individuals and periods is a very bold measure of par-
ticipants' behavior, especially if our working hypotheses are correct and gender
dierences vary with the context. To understand whether this is so, in the next
section we distinguish between two types of decision rules that people may adopt in
this experiment. Participants may adopt unconditional rules, such as pure selsh-
ness and strict egalitarianism, that do not require information about the context of
the decision, i.e., information about individual eorts and the result of the random
shock. On the other hand, people may adopt conditional rules, such as liberal egal-
10itarianism and libertarism, that do require information about the previous phase
of the experiment. Based on our rst hypothesis, we expect a higher frequency of
conditional decisions in women.
4.3 Gender dierences in allocation rules
Figure 3 reports the frequency of dierent allocation rules by gender. A majority
of men's decision (60.2%) are purely selsh, and men rarely display egalitarian or
conditional behaviors. In sharp contrast, women take more egalitarian (27.8%) than
selsh (25.3%) decisions, and they also adopt a conditional principle, either liberal
egalitarian or libertarian, in 12.5% and 14% of the cases respectively.2
Figure 3: Frequency of dierent principles
2We classify decisions according to the exact prediction of each rule. Given that 80% of decisions
exactly coincide with one of the four behavioral rules described so far, in the following analyses we
will not put any additional structure on the data in order to avoid an over-tting of the data.
11The fact that women are more egalitarian than men has been reported in previous
studies (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Dufwenberg and Muren 2006; Guth et al.
2007). However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has shown that women are
also more equitable. This later result gives support to the srt hypothesis made in
section 3. Equity rules are conditional by denition; people need to use information
about the production phase to determine what is the equitable distribution. The fact
that women make equity choices more often than men is consistent with the idea that
female behavior is partly conditional, while men behavior is mostly unconditionally
selsh.
We estimate the probability of taking a decision in accordance with a conditional
principle using a random-eect probit model and controlling for the period. We nd
that women are signicantly more likely to adopt a conditional principle than men
(see Table 2 in Appendix A). We also show that women are signicantly more likely
to split the pie equally and that men are signicantly more likely to behave selshly.
Although the higher rate of conditional behavior suggests that women are more
sensitive to the context of the experiment, context sensitivity can only be tested in
a repeated setting where individual decisions are studied across dierent contexts.
In the next section, we exploit the within-subject feature of our design to test our
second hypothesis.
4.4 Adoption of decision principles
We predicted above that individual women would adopt a larger number of decision
principles than individual men. To test this hypothesis, we look at the number of
dierent decision principles that each participant adopted in the experiment. For
example, a participant that always split the pie equally adopts one principle; on the
other hand, if a participant alternates between keeping the whole pie and splitting
12it equally, that participant adopts two principles. We consider only three types of
principles: selshness, strict egalitarianism and conditional behavior.3
Figure 4: Number of decision principles
Figure 4 shows the number of men and women that adopt one principle or more
than one principle. Consistent with our second prediction, most men (60%) adopt
only one decision principle, selshness. In contrast, most women (62%) adopt more
than one principle.4 The dierence in the selection of multiple principles between
men and women is signicant at 5% level (Z =  1:6951, p = 0:045).5 Among
the women that adopt more than one principle, about two thirds (12) adopt two
3For some games, the two conditional principles dened in section 2, liberal egalitarian and
libertaria, predict the same behavior. This is why we decide to consider the two principles together
in this section. Treating the two principles separately does not change the results reported here.
4We only include 29 women in the analysis. We cannot classify any of the twenty decisions of
one of the female participants, so we decided to exclude her from the analysis.
5We use a one-sided two-group test of proportion that assumes that women are more likely to
adopt multiple principles.
13principles and one third (6) the three principles (see Table 4 in Appendix A).
This result conrms our second hypothesis and gives support to Croson and Gneezy's
organizing explanation using a within-subject analysis. In this experiment, more
women than men adopt a multiplicity of principles, therefore they change their be-
havior more often. This result, combined with the fact that women adopt conditional
principles more often than men, suggest that women are in fact more sensitive to
the decision-making context.
5 Conclusion
There is a tradition in moral psychology which maintains that women dier form
men in moral decision making (Gilligan 1982). One of the main dierences suggested
in that literature is that women are more sensitive to social cues in determining
appropriate behavior than are men (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Although this idea
has been discussed in several Behavioral Economics studies, appropiate empirical
tests have proven elusive to date. We believe that the reason for this elusiveness is the
lack of an experimental framework for testing women's higher context sensitivity in
the economic lab. We provide an example of such a framework in this paper following
the suggestion of Croson and Gneezy (2009) in a recent review article. These authors
argue that `small dierences in experimental design and implementation will thus
have larger impacts on female participants than on male participants' (p. 463).
In this paper, we have investigated the dierent reactions of men and women to
changes in the experimental context. The context that we study is a repeated dis-
tribution situation in which experimental participants can potentially adopt dierent
principles of justice. In this respect, participants may switch between dierent prin-
ciples when the experimental context changes. Previous studies have shown that
14not only do dierent people adopt dierent principles, but they adopt one principle
or another depending on the context (Messik and Sentis 1979; Babcock et al. 1995;
Ubeda 2010).
Women's higher context-sensitivity is operationalized in two ways. First, we look at
whether participants' decision principles are conditional on the experimental con-
text. We dene purely selsh and egalitarian behaviors as unconditional principles,
since people do not need to know the context of the decision to use them. On the
contrary, we dene dierent forms of equitable behavior as conditional principles,
since participants need to use information about the source of the money to be
distributed. Second, we study whether women adopt a larger number of dierent
decision principles than men. This is a proxy for women's higher probability of
changing behavior across contexts.
We nd that women adopt conditional principles signicantly more often than men.
Therefore, women's behavior is more often conditional on the context of the experi-
ment. Additionally, we nd that the proportion of individual women adopting more
than one principle is signicantly higher than the proportion of men. These two
results are just two examples of women's higher context sensitivity.
To conclude, the experiment reported on in this paper provides support for Croson
and Gneezy's (2009) hypothesis about the larger impact on women of dierences in
experimental design and implementation. This is the rst paper in which Croson
and Gneezy's hypothesis has been explicitly tested and, although the results clearly
support it, further new evidence as well as replications of the existing results are
needed.
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Number of observations=1200 Number of subjects=60
*** p < 0:01 ** p < 0:05 * p < 0:1
Table 1: Random Eect Linear Regression Estimates of Gender Dierences in Performance and
Distribution (Standard Errors in Parentheses).
Rules Men Women
Selsh 361 (60.2%) 152 (25.3%)
Strict Egalitarian 55 (9.2%) 167 (27.8%)
Liberal Egalitarian 30 (5.0%) 75 (12.5%)
Libertarian 23 (3.8%) 84 (14.0%)
Others 172 (26.8%) 223 (31.8%)
Note: The sum of the percentage in Table 1 is higher than 100%. That is because of in some
cases dierent rules predict the same behavior.
Table 2: Frequency of dierent principles.
19Selsh Strict Egalitarian Conditional
Cons 0.682 -2.894*** -2.166***
(0.453) (0.408) (0.289)
Period 0.062*** -0.034*** -0.013
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010)
Women -3.908*** 1.795*** 0.927***
(0.616) (0.579) (0.324)
Number of observations=1200 Number of subjects=60
*** p < 0:01 ** p < 0:05 * p < 0:1
Table 3: Random Eect Probit Estimates of the Probability of Choosing Dierent Allocation
Principles (Standard Errors in Parentheses).
Rules Men Women
1 principle 18 (60%) 11 (38%)
2 principles 9 (30%) 12 (41%)
3 principles 3 (10%) 6 (21%)
Total 30 (100%) 29 (100%)
Table 4: Number of decision principles.
Appendix B: Instructions
Dear participants,
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. The experiment will
last for about one and a half hour. Please do remain quiet from now on until the end
of the experiment. You will have the opportunity to ask questions in a few minutes,
they will be answered privately.
INSTRUCTIONS
20The experiment consists of 20 periods and in each period there will be two phases.
First phase
 At the beginning of every single period, groups of two people will be formed.
You will be randomly paired with another participant in this room. You will
remain together until the end of that period. None of you will know with
whom you have been paired.
 On the computer screen you will see a series of puzzles in which the letters
of a word are scrambled. It is your task to unscramble them. You will see
one scrambled word at a time, with a blank below each given letter. In each
blank, enter the letter that you think belongs in that space in the correct,
unscrambled word. In each blank, please enter only one letter, with no
spaces, and use only the letters given in the original scramble. None of the
words is an acronym. The words are the same for all the participants
in this room and they will follow the same sequence.
 You may use the mouse or the TAB (on the keyboard) to switch to the next
blank.
 You will have a total of 90 seconds to correctly solve as many scrambles as
you can. For each correct answer, you will receive 4 tokens. In each period
there are ten words to unscramble.
 You may leave a puzzle blank, but once you click on the 'Submit and Continue
to Next Puzzle' button, you will not be able to return to that puzzle.
 At the end of the rst phase, you will know: the number of tokens you receive in
that period; the number of tokens the other participant of your group receives
in that period; and the total number of tokens the two of you receive.
21Second phase
 The second phase starts with a random shock. This shock may aect the
number of tokens of each participant with 50% probability. It is independent
that the other participant was aected by the shock for you to be aected as
well. The shock works in one of the following ways:
1. By halving your tokens;
2. By halving the tokens of the other participant;
3. By halving the tokens of both participants in the group;
4. By not halving any participant's tokens.
 Both participants in the group have to decide how to distribute the total
number of tokens of the group (your tokens + the other participant's tokens)
between the two group members. The decision will be taken individually and
anonymously. Neither you nor the other participant will know the decision of
the other.
 After the 20 periods have been completed, the computer will randomly choose
one of the twenty periods to be paid. Only the decision of one participant
in each group will be implemented. All earned tokens will be exchanged into
pounds at the end of the experiment and paid in cash according to the following
exchange rate:
3 tokens = $1
Finally, each participant will be informed about her/his earnings, which will consist
of the prot from the experiment plus the participation fee ($4).
We ask you to remain quiet during the whole experiment. Those who do not respect
the silence requirement will be asked to leave the experimental room. Once the
22experiment is nished, please remain seated. We will need between 10 and 15
minutes to calculate your payment. We will move to another room and you will be
called up successively by the number on your table; you will then receive an envelope
with your earnings and you will be asked to sign a receipt.
Finally, note that your participation is considered voluntary and you are free to
leave the room at any point if you wish to do so. In that case, we will only pay you
the participation fee of $4.
Please leave these instructions on your table when you leave the room.
You can take notes on these pages if you wish to do so.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
23